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Kentucky's Invasion of
Privacy Tort--A Reappraisal
W. THOMAS BUNCH*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Invasion of Privacy Tort is a unique development in the
annals of Anglo-American jurisprudence. In the nineteenth cen-
tury this country experienced a gigantic population expansion,
a growing urbanization, and a rapidly increasing industrialization.
With these growths came increasing social interrelationships
among individuals. Moreover, these individuals were more re-
fined in culture, morality, mores, and social conduct. Thus, we
have sophisticated individuals placed in a situation that makes it
difficult to keep their private lives their own.
The common law had no legal concept which could protect an
invasion of an individual's privacy, and, most certainly, alleged
violations of privacy were not founded upon the recognition of
privacy as a legal "right." Early courts, however, did assert some
authority over certain violations, but their theory was predicated
upon some right of property, breach of trust or confidence, or
upon the laws of libel and slander.' Hence, a man who violated
another's privacy could be held liable for damages as a trespasser,
or a man who revealed another's business or family secrets to
third persons might be liable for breach of some contract right,
or a man who published libelous or slanderous material could be
held liable for defamation.2
However, the scope of these remedies was not sufficient to af-
ford adequate protection for the many invasions of privacy which
could and did occur. A man could, for example, stand on a public
thoroughfare and utter nondefamatory remarks about another's
personal life, causing damage to the other, without affording the
* Member of the Kentucky Bar; LL.B., University of Kentucky, 1964; Mem-
ber of the firm of Anggelis & Vimont, Lexington, Kentucky.
1 See note 14 infra, and accompanying text.
2 See note 29 infra, and accompanying text.
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damaged individual a remedy in contract or tort.3 These short-
comings were recognized in 1890 in a law journal article by War-
ren and Brandeis, wherein they urged that every individual had
an enforceable right to live his life without the intrusion of others
upon his private affairs and without unwarranted publicity about
matters in which the public had no legitimate interest.4 This
article was treated by many legal scholars as creating a new concept
in common law and has been noted by later scholars as the "birth"
of the privacy tort as an individual right.5
II. EARLY CASES
The Invasion of Privacy Doctrine developed in Kentucky case
law before publication of the Warren and Brandeis article.
Grigsby v. Breckinridge is perhaps the first example of what is to-
day denominated the Invasion of Privacy Tort. There, a husband
sought to prevent the publication of certain letters that had been
written to his deceased wife. Although a majority of the Court
held that publication could not be prohibited, the opinion in-
timated that if the petitioner claimed that the publication would
affect the memory of his wife or in any way subject him to a loss
or annoyance, he might have a remedy. The Court made no at-
tempt to suggest what that remedy might be.
The dissenting judge seemed to approach the modern doctrine
as he wrote:
As I regard the sacred, secret privacy of the family relation
and its security against the prying eye of the curious, I dis-
sent from the recognition of any legal rule which will expose
these sacred relations and private affairs to the gaze of the
world or outside communities through the agency of either
husband or wife.7
3 Id. This example was created to exemplify the juxtaposition of a violated
privacy right vis-a-vis wrongs recognized at common law, i.e., if a man did not
violate a common law right or commit a crime, but did violate another's privacy,
the harmed person had no legal redress.4 Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 H~Av. L. REv. 193 (1890).
For adoption of this article by the courts, see, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co.,
113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp.
957 (D.C. Minn. 1948).
5 Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 H nv. L. REv. 343, 363 (1914).
6 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480 (1867); see Moreland, The Right of Privacy Toda,
19 Ky. L. J. 101 (1931); Ragland, The Right of Privacy, 17 Ky. L. J. 85 (1929).
Contra, Lisle, The Right of Privacy (A Contra View), 19 Ky. L. J. 137 (1931).
7 Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480 (1867).
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The majority opinion reflected the serious import given to prop-
erty law during that period and illustrated the paucity of legal
protection given to personal rights. However, the dissenting
opinion exemplified the trend toward recognition of privacy as a
legal right.
In another early Kentucky case reflecting this trend, Douglas
v. Stokes,8 a photographer was employed by the parents of a set of
Siamese twins, born dead, to make twelve photographs and no
more. The photographer manufactured additional copies and
obtained a copyright on them from the Federal Government. The
parents filed suit claiming that publication of the photographs
caused them humiliation and wounded their feelings and sensibi-
lities. The Court allowed relief on the basis of an English case,
followed uniformly in this country,9 which assertedly held that
the act of selling or exposing extra copies of a photograph was an
implied or expressed breach of contract.10 The photographer had
received contractual authority to make the photographs from the
parents, but he breached the contract when he exceeded that
authority. The Court struck aside any objections to its decision by
declaring that a man could recover for injury or indignity to his
body, "and it would be a reproach to the law if physical injuries
might be recovered for, and not those incorporeal injuries which
cause much greater suffering and humiliation.""
Douglas involved two dead bodies, and the law had long held,
without cavil, that no property right existed in a dead body. How-
ever, the true but hidden issue involved an act which caused in-
jury or harm to the parents' feelings and sensibilities; there was no
question of contractual rights. Recovery for harm to feelings and
sensibilities, therefore, can be maintained within the context of
this case on the grounds of unwarranted invasion of their right of
privacy. Although the case can only be rationalized in this manner,
there was no mention of privacy as an individual right.
Foster-Milburn v. Chinn2 likewise can be rationalized by to-
8 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912).
9 Pollard v. Photographing Co., 40 Ch. D. 345 (1888).
1 0 The Court cited no Kentucky authority for this proposition, but it found
support in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Press Publishing Co. v. Falk, 59 F. 324
(S.D.N.Y. 1894); Corliss v. Waller, 57 F. 434 (1st Cir. 1893); Moore v. Rugg,
44 Minn. 28, 46 N.W. 141 (1890); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134
S.W. 1076 (1911).
11 Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 509, 149 S.W. 849, 850 (1912).
12 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909).
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day's invasion of privacy doctrine; this case, however, was also
decided under a theory that did not recognize privacy as a "right"
or a common law cause of action. There the appellant used the
appellee's name and recommendation in advertising the appel-
lant's patent medicine. The appellee had never given such a
recommendation nor had he authorized the company's use of his
name. Damages were recovered at trial for humiliation, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds that there was an actual
defamation involved in the case. Although there is an important
difference between verbal slander and a written or printed publi-
cation, words which bring a person disgrace, ridicule, odium, or
contempt present a question of fact for a jury and require the
proof of damages. The Court, however, used words quite un-
usual for the year in which the opinion was written:
While there is some conflict in the authorities, we concur with
those holding that a person is entitled to a right of privacy as
to his picture, and that the publication of a picture of a person
without his consent, as a part of an advertisement for the pur-
pose of exploiting the publisher's business, is a violation of
the right of privacy, and entitles him to recover without proof
of special damages.' 3
The Court went on to say that the public is defrauded by the
publication of unauthentic endorsements by public figures. Thus,
the Court, although on the verge of deciding this case squarely on
the issue of the right of privacy, ruled, in effect, that the case was
more in the area of defamation or fraud than invasion of privacy.
A later Kentucky decision broadened the "doctrine" of privacy
without even using the term in its opinion. In Thompson v. A del-
burg & Berman, Inc.,14 the defendant was a bill collector who left
numerous notes at the plaintiff's home, some of which were posi-
tioned so that passersby could read them.15 The notes read:
"Please take notice. OUR COLLECTOR. Our collector was here
for payment. THE UNION CLOTHING STORE." The plaintiff
filed suit for libel. The Court said that, to be libelous per se,
written or printed words need not impute moral turpitude, in-
'3 Id. at 432, 120 S.W. at 366.
14181 Ky. 487, 205 S.W. 558 (1918).
15 These notes were placed in such locations-apertures and crevices of the
front door, windows, and on a stick in the front yard-that they could be seen
by passersby.
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fectious disease, unfitness for office or employment, or be pre-
judicial to a person in his profession or trade or tend to dis-
credit him. It was sufficient that the words had the natural and
reasonable tendency to disgrace or degrade him, or to render him
odious, ridiculous, or contemptible in the estimation of the public.
Since these notes tended to disgrace the plaintiff in public esti-
mation, they were found to be libelous per se.
Subsequent decisions have also held that advertising that a
debt was due was an invasion of privacy and actionable.,6 Thomp-
son, however, turned on the Court's holding of libel per se. How-
ever, the plaintiff admitted owing the debt, and truth is an abso-
lute defense in a libel action. Hence, the only reasonable rationale
of the Court's holding was that they were recognizing privacy
as a right sub silentio.
Thus, the conclusion can be reached that Kentucky did have a
limited recognition of a privacy doctrine prior to the Warren-
Brandeis article, under and only under certain conditions: the
conduct complained of had to be intolerable or the damages had
to be obviously clear. The legal concepts could be earmarked
under some historical or common law theory.1
7
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT
In 1927, however, the Court of Appeals decided Brents v.
Morgan,'18 wherein the Warren-Brandeis article was incorporated
16The Kentucky Court reached the same result in a later case with similar
facts, Lucas v. Moskins Stores, 262 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1953). With regard to at-
tempts to collect debts, the law seems to be in accord throughout the various
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Davis v. General Finance & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708,
57 S.E.2d 225 (1950); Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789
(1948); Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862 (1962); Pack v. Wise,
15 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1963); Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau,
Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 67, 177 P.2d 896 (1947).
17Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912), is illustrative of
the growing recognition of privacy as a right and a violation thereof as a tort. The
decision further developed this trend, but it did not signify recognition of a broad,
general, and pure right of privacy.
18221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927). This case, and later Kentucky cases,
have seemingly avoided pinpointing the derivation of the right of privacy. How-
ever, courts in other jurisdictions have said that the right had its foundations in,
and was derived from, natural law. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847
(3rd Cir. 1936); Voelker v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 43, 75 N.E.2d 548 (1947). For
the proposition that this right is therefore immutable, absolute, and above the
power of authority to alter or abolish it, see McGrovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J.
Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (1945), aff'g 137 N.J. Eq. 548, 45 A. 2d 842 (1945), noted
in Annot., 168 A.L.R. 446, 448 (1947).
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virtually in toto into case law. Here, Brents placed a placard in his
show window, announcing that Dr. Morgan, a veterinarian, owed
him money, and that if promises would pay an account, this one
would have been settled long ago. The sign went on to say that
the debt would be advertised until paid. The placard was five feet
by eight feet in dimension and was placed in a conspicuous man-
ner facing the street from Brents' garage business.
Dr. Morgan filed suit, alleging that the sign caused him great
mental pain, humiliation, and mortification, that it tended to ex-
pose him to public contempt, ridicule, adversion, and disgrace,
and caused an evil opinion of him in the minds of the tradesmen
and the public generally. Brents demurred on the grounds that
all the statements contained in the placard were true, and that
since there was no allegation in Morgan's petition that these state-
ments were false, the petition failed to state a cause of action since
truth was an absolute defense. The demurrer was overruled, and
the case went to trial, resulting in a one thousand dollar verdict
for the plaintiff.
On appeal, Morgan admitted that truth was a defense to libel,
but he insisted that the cause of action, even if not good in libel,
should nevertheless be sustained by the Court. He argued that the
publication was an invasion of his rights and constituted a
malicious wrong, and that there should be some remedy. The
Court considered the Warren-Brandeis article"9 and its suggested
rules and exceptions, reviewed Grisby v. Breckinridge,20 Douglas
v. Stokes,21 and Foster-Milburn v. Chinn.22 It then ruled:
We shall not attempt to bring together in this opinion a cita-
tion of the opinions of other Courts on this question. We are
content to hold that there is a right of privacy and that the
unwarranted invasion of such right may be made the subject
of an action in tort to recover damages from such unwar-
ranted invasion. The legal path which is written at the en-
trance "privacy" or "right of privacy" is new and by no means
well trodden, and for that reason, we venture upon it with
some hesitancy and with all safeguards. 23
19 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2.
20 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480 (1867).
21149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912).
22 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909).
2 3 Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 774, 299 S.W. 967, 971 (1927).
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In general terms, Brents declares that the right of privacy is
the right to be let alone. It envelopes the right to be free from un-
warranted publicity and the right to live without unwarranted
interference regarding matters with which the public is not
necessarily concerned. A violation of this right is a tort, and the
tortfeasor is responsible for damages to the injured party. The tort
is, however, subject to certain exceptions: (1) the publication of
matter which is in the public or general interest is not pro-
hibited;24 (2) the tort does not prohibit the communication of any
matter, though in its nature private, when the publication is made
under circumstances which would render it a privileged com-
munication according to the rules of libel and slander;2 5 (3) there
is no violation if the invasion is made orally;26 (4) the right of
privacy ceases upon the publication of facts by the individual or
with his consent.27 The truth of the matter published or the
absence of malice does not afford a defense in dealing with an
unwarranted invasion of privacy.2 8
The right of privacy concerns a person's right to maintain his
privacy and to live an individual life. The right protected is ana-
logous to the more strongly protected interest to be free from un-
wanted intentional physical contacts by others, e.g., assault and
battery. In other respects, it is similar to a legal interest in reputa-
tion, which is the basis for defamation, since both rights have a
definite relation to the opinions of third persons in the injury re-
sulting from humiliation, ridicule, mortification, disg-race, mental
pain and suffering, and others .29 Privacy, however, is relative to the
customs of the time and place, to the habits and occupation of the
injured party, and to the events surrounding his life. One who
desires to be a recluse must nevertheless be subject to the incidents
of ordinary community life; one who exposes a portion of his
2 4 See, e.g., Sellers v. Henry, 329 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1959), wherein the Court
of Appeals remanded for a factual determination of whether a photograph, alleged
to have been an invasion of the plaintiff's privacy, was a matter of public interest.
25 See the discussion, infra, concerning the close relationship of defamation
and privacy.2 6 See, e.g., Horstman v. Newman, 291 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1956); Gregory v.
Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d 510 (1943). Both cases were dismissed
in the trial court on the grounds that the alleged invasions were oral.
27 There is no Kentucky case involving self-publication or consent.
28 Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 770-71, 299 S.W. 967, 969-70 (1927).
29 See, e.g., Thompson v. Adelburg & Berman, Inc., 181 Ky. 487, 205 S.W.
558 (1918).
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private life to the public, therefore, cannot complain of pub-
licity,30 for he waives certain rights of privacy. An elected official
cannot complain of photographs of himself or his family; a writer
cannot complain of critical reviews of his literary works. Defama-
tion and fair comment are the boundaries to the privacy of such
persons.31
The many interests in privacy may be described as "conven-
tional, that is, cultivated or acquired." 32 All are dependent upon
standards of decent conduct, and social and aesthetic values. Thus,
manners and morals become the bases of refinements in the ap-
plications of social interrelationships between members of a
civilization. As the civilization becomes more complex, as has
America in the last century, new interests emerge and new values
evolve, many of which concern privacy.
The evolution of the interest in protecting the right of privacy
is best described as follows:
Throughout their growth the courts have recognized the
cultivation of the interests in privacy slowly, at first, only by
protecting them when they were associated with some other
long recognized interest and in so doing, creating a type of
parasitic damages. 33
Many early courts, however, were apt to deny the existence of any
right of privacy because of the purely mental character of the
damages claimed, the lack of explicit common law precedent, the
vast amount of litigation that might be expected to result, the
problem of distinguishing public and private personages, and the
fear of limiting the freedoms of speech and press.34 Other courts
simply rejected the entire concept.3 5 Often, relief was given for
intrusion upon a privacy interest, but justification rested on other
legal theories. The most common rationalization was the trespass
30 See, e.g., Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D.
Minn. 1948).3 1 There are no invasion of privacy cases in Kentucky involving persons of
public interest and their legally iplied incapacity to complain of publicity, but
such cases have arisen in other jurisdictions, particularly New York and California.
See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950).
321 F. Hma, an & F. JAm~s, Tim LAw oF TORTS § 9.5 (1956).
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 171 N.Y. 588, 64 N.E.
442 (Ct. App. 1902).
35 See, e.g., Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 872, 80 N.W.
285 (1899).
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to land theory. Thus, where a defendant's conduct affected the
plaintiff's property rights in some manner, full redress was allowed
despite the fact that the plaintiff's proprietary interest may have
been trivial.38 These courts seemed to look for a common law
rationalization upon which to predicate recovery for a violation
which was actually against the plaintiff's interest in privacy. If a
man entered upon another's property and insulted the owner, the
latter's recovery for damages was predicated upon a technical
trespass, 37 whereas the true interest violated was his right to be
left alone.
Another theoretical subterfuge which early courts used to
justify the protection of privacy interests was assault and battery.
Abusive or insulting language, indecent proposals, or behavior
causing ridicule and humiliation were redressed by allowing the
injured party to recover on a technical theory of assault. If an un-
reasonable offensive touching or touching in anger occurred, then
recovery was permitted under the technical theory of a battery.
Here again, it is obvious, at least in retrospect, that the gravamen
of the wrong was the insult to one's personal dignity and self-re-
spect, and the damages were ridicule, humiliation, and embar-
rassment; these are the elements of the privacy interest, not the
verbal threat or physical touching.
When the interest of privacy, vis-&-vis the courts' treatments of
the factual situations presented in these earlier cases, are viewed
in retrospect, the inescapable conclusion is that the distended
theories were the products of changing times and the needs of the
law to adjust with those times. The idea or doctrine of privacy,
being a new concept developed during a formative period in the
technological, sociological, and jurisprudential areas, was con-
sistently applied and adapted to a great number of varying situa-
tions,
which had in common only [an] unwarranted intrusion upon
an individual's personal affairs. It became, in a sense, a catch-
all for a great number of cases in which mental suffering or
other emotional distress was the primary injury sustained and
for which no other substantive theory for relief was avail-
able.a8
26 F. HARPEn & F. JAmFs, supra note 32.
37id.
38 Id. at § 9.6.
1968]
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The result has solidified today into a tort, broadly denoted as
the "right of privacy."8 9 Prosser classifies the tort as containing
four separate, distinct forms based on different elements: 1) "in-
trusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion"; 40 2)
"public disclosure of private facts"; 41 3) "publicity which places
the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye"; 42 4) "appropriation,
for the defendant's benefit or advantage, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness." 43 Prosser is careful to point out that the four forms are
distinct and contain different elements.
[T]he first and second require the invasion of something
secret, secluded or private pertaining to the plaintiff; the third
and fourth do not. The second and third depend upon pub-
licity, while the first does not, nor does the fourth, although
it usually involves it. The third requires falsity or fiction; the
other three do not. The fourth involves a use for the de-
fendant's advantage, which is not true of the rest.4
Despite the conflicting theories of justification, the invasion of
privacy tort is here to stay. Prosser reports that thirty-one states
have judicially adopted some form of recognition with a probabil-
ity of recognition in four more states and legislative recognition
in some form in four states; only four states explicitly reject
it.45
Early Kentucky courts wrestled with the sham theories noted
above in the Grigsby, Douglas, and Foster-Milburn decisions and
authorized recovery of damages where the crux of the wrong was
insult to dignity and self-respect without explicit recognition of
the right of privacy as a valid cause of action. Douglas was decided
fifteen years prior to the total embodiment of the Warren-
Brandeis theory in Brents, and it is at least illustrative of the early
common law "recognition" of privacy as a right and a violation
thereof as a tort. This was accomplished through the hit-or-miss
technique of "doing justice" by finding some technical legal peg
upon which to predicate liability.
39 Cf. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 867 (1939): "A person who unreasonably
and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to
others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other."
40W. PiiosSa, LAW OF TORTS 833 (3d ed. 1964).
41 Id. at 834.
42 Id. at 837.
43 Id. at 839.
44 Id. at 843.
45 Id. at 831-32.
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Brents relied upon these three cases as appropriate evidence
that Kentucky law possessed an enforceable right of privacy and
then reconciled them into a judicial recognition of that right,
rationalizing by adopting the Warren-Brandeis explanation. The
latter half of the opinion is a virtual rewrite of the law journal
article. However, the article and the opinion were phrased in
broad generalities and definitive propositions without explicit
justifications of theory. Absent any constructive and explicit
theory of the tort, the Kentucky Court has subsequently been
forced to apply these generalities to widely varied factual situa-
tions. Further, the Court has failed to evolve a detailed, complete,
practical working rule to determine whether a violation has
occurred.43 Rather, it has proceeded on an ad hoc basis, ruling
that under the particular circumstances presented, a person's
privacy has or has not been invaded. The absence of a clear and
definitive statement of the rule temporizes or lessens the trial
court's ability, in a given case, to decide the applicable law and
render valid, usable instructions when the procedure requires a
submission to the jury. Moreover, the Court of Appeals becomes
an arbiter of the facts in almost every case presented to it.
IV. Tm MODERN RuLE
The definitive statements in Brents v. Morgan and subsequent
decisions should give a reasonable explanation of the justification
of the Kentucky Invasion of Privacy Doctrine. In Trammel v.
Citizens News Company, Inc.,47 a notice was printed in the de-
fendant company's newspaper, even though the editor had been
requested previously to refuse publication. The notice announced
that Reverend Trammel owed a grocery bill and the store sug-
gested that he come in and make arrangements for settlement.
Suit was filed against the newspaper alleging violation of the right
of privacy. The Court remarked, in allowing the plaintiff relief,
that a man's feelings are as much a part of his person as his limbs
4 0 This failure to evolve a working rule as to the tort may be due, in part, to
the infrequent and relatively small number of privacy cases brought before the
Court of Appeals. New York and California, on the other band, have had a larger
number of cases presented to their highest courts and thus have, through
necessity, solidified the theory into a concrete rue. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750
(1950).
47 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
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and that this was an action to protect the former from injury.
The contents of the notice were not matters of public interest,
and the newspaper company knew that publication would tend to
expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, and disgrace. No
explicit statement was made as to the theory upon which relief
was granted. The Court merely observed that the fact situation
fit squarely under previous Kentucky cases, particularly Brents v.
Morgan.
In 1931, in Rhodes v. Graham,48 the defendant allegedly tap-
ped the plaintiff's telephone. The gist of the plaintiff's complaint
was that his right of privacy had been damaged by the appellees;
he also brought an action of trespass vi et armis, asserting a pro-
perty right in the telephone and equipment which had been
trespassed upon by the appellees. The Court of Appeals reviewed
the article written by Warren and Brandeis and held that the
evil incident to the invasion of privacy of the telephone is as great
as that occasioned by the unwarranted publicity of one's private
affairs in newspapers. Hence, as a matter of law, wiretapping is
akin to eavesdropping, an indictable offense at common law, and,
although it was not a punishable offense in the state of Kentucky,
the facts alleged did constitute a wrong to the appellant. In effect,
the Court recognized that eavesdropping or wiretapping was a
violation of the Invasion of Privacy Tort in Kentucky, and that
it should be sustained as a valid cause of action.49 The Court
again relied almost exclusively upon the Warren-Brandeis article
and the Brents decision.
A different fact situation, however, arose in Tomlin v. Taylor.,0
There, the defendant engaged in a franchise renewal fight with the
bus company and published by way of letters to a local newspaper,
copies of the company's state income tax reports. The plaintiff,
president of the bus company, alleged that these publications
deliberately and maliciously injured, damaged, and destroyed his
company's business, and in so doing, they violated his right of
48238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931).
49 Accord, McDaniel v. Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2
S.E.2d 810 (1939), where the defendant's "bugging" of the plaintiff's hospital
room to determine the truth or falsity of a claim against it was held to constitute
a cause of action; Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958), in
which the plaintiff tenant was :.''orded an action because of a listening device
installed in 7is apartment by the landlord.
50290 Ky. 619, 162 S.W.2d 210 (1942).
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privacy by destroying his good will, esteem, and confidence with
the citizenry. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the
Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed; the violation did not reach
the principal officer of the bus company, whose right of privacy
was not invaded. Applying the Brents rule to Tomlin, there was
the necessary intent to commit an act, there were flagrant cir-
cumstances, and there was at least some kind of deliberate attempt
to injure or coerce. The Court's holding, however, involved a
mere technical limitation of the right: it does not pass through a
corporation to its official personnel.'
In Jones v. Herald Post Company, 2 a wife made certain
vehement and excited statements shortly after her husband had
been stabbed to death while they were walking along a city street.
The defendant newspaper company printed her picture and the
statements. The wife filed suit alleging that her privacy had been
invaded, and that she had been subjected to unwarranted and
undesired publicity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of her complaint, stating that "the publication of
the photograph in connection with the language attributed to
Mrs. Jones, even though she was incorrectly quoted, was not an
invasion of her right of privacy." The Court rationalized that she
was an actor in an occurrence which became of public or general
interest and there could not be an invasion of the right of privacy
when her photograph was published along with an account of the
occurrence.
Sellers v. Henry 3 involved a photograph of a mutilated child
killed in an accident, taken by a state police officer in his official
capacity at the accident scene and subsequently published by him.
The child's parents brought suit for invasion of their privacy by
the defendant's publication of the photograph. The Court re-
versed a judgment for the defendant, stating that the material fact
of whether the photograph was of public interest had been left
unanswered by the trial court. The Court did review, however,
several cases in other jurisdictions which had ruled that photo-
51 But see Engleman v. Caldwell and Jones, 243 Ky. 23, 47 S.W.2d 971
(1932), where the defendants deliberate and persistent attempts to drive trade
away from the plaintiff's business was held to be actionable, and to authorize
the imposition of punitive damages. It is interesting to note also that the loss
of business was occasioned primarily by oral statements.
522 80 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929).
53 329 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1959).
198
KENTrUCKY LAW JOURNAL[Vl56
graphs taken of dead persons cannot give rise to a cause of action.
Perhaps the most illuminating case applicable to the discussion
herein is Voneye v. Turner.54 There, the defendant, an agent of a
finance company, signed and mailed a letter to the plaintiff's
employer seeking aid in the collection of a debt owed by the
plaintiff to the finance company. The letter explained only the
details of the business transaction with the finance company and
the plea that "anything you can do for us in this matter will
certainly be appreciated."5 5 Suit was filed claiming an invasion of
privacy; the action, however, was dismissed at the trial level. The
Court's reasoning is not nearly as important here as the discussion
of the applicable law. The Court began its discussion of the tort
by quoting from Brents: "[A person has a right] to be free from
unwarranted publicity, or the right to live without unwarranted
interference by the public about matters with which the public
is not necessarily concerned."'56 The notable point is the Court's
emphasis of "unwarranted." The Court continued and again used
the word "unwarranted" when quoting from American Juris-
prudence.57 Applying the test of "unwarranted" publicity or inter-
ference, the Court distinguished the factual situation in Voneye
from Brents and Thompson58 and was able to rule as a matter of
law that the letter in Voneye was not an unwarranted invasion of
privacy. The Court noted that the letter did not contain any words
of contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace. Further, it pointed out
that an employer is interested in the ability and reputation of his
employee as to the payment of debts. The payment of debts affects
the employee's efficiency and saves the employer the annoyance
and expense of answering garnishments and other letters. With
this reasoning, the Court indicated that the action of the defendant
finance company in this particular case, although it may well have
54 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1951).
55 Id. at 589.
56 Id. at 590.
5" Id. The Court points out:
[The right of privacy is] defined in 41 Am. Jur. "Privacy" § 2, p.
925 as: "The right of a person to be free from unwarranted publicity,
and as a right to live without unwarranted interference by the public in
matters with which the public is not necessarily concerned." Section 12,
p. 984 of the same text says: "The right of privacy is relative to the
customs of the time and place, and it is determined by the norm of
ordinary man."
58 181 Ky. 487, 205 S.W. 558 (1918).
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been an invasion of privacy, was not an unwarranted invasion of
privacy.
Voneye appears to hold that the test for defining the extent
of the right of privacy is based upon the standard of conduct or
action of the ordinary, reasonably prudent man. This is consistent
with the reasonably prudent man test applied in other tort cases, 59
and it indicates that the Court simply asks whether the defendant
was negligent. In an invasion of privacy case, a negligence standard
means that the basic question presented to the court or jury is
whether the act committed by the defendant was an unwarranted
invasion of privacy. Courts do not hesitate to remind one that
this is a world where one cannot live without expecting some inter-
ference from other members of society. The problem involved in
these types of cases, however, is whether the involvement or inter-
ference with the individual was unwarranted. Hence, it would be
logical to ask whether the act committed was an act which a
reasonable man would consider unwarranted. At least this would
be a valid explanation of the theory of the Kentucky Invasion of
Privacy Tort.
The Voneye rationalization was thereafter applied in Perry v.
Moskins Stores60 under a dichotomous situation. The defendant
mailed a post card containing the statement: "Please call Wabash
1492 and ask for Carolyn." The post card, delivered to the plain-
tiff's home, was received by his wife who, believing the note to be
from her husband's paramour, left him. The post card, however,
was merely an advertising stunt conducted by the defendant's
store. Suit was filed on the grounds that the plaintiff lost his wife
because of the defendant's invasion of his privacy. The Court of
Appeals affirmed dismissal, stating that the modem-day advertising
techniques are in effect a limitation on an individual's right of
privacy and are not actionable unless unreasonable. By this state-
ment and its mention of Voneye, the Court applied and reaffirmed
the reasonable man test. Here, the test resulted in the ruling, as
G9 See RESTATmENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939). See also Daily Times Democrat
v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964); Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co.,
40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953); Kom v. Rennison, 21 Conn. Supp. 400,
156 A.2d 476 (1959); Harms v. Miami Daily News, 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1961);
Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan. 275, 262 P.2d 808 (1953); Truxes v.
Kenco Enterprises, Inc., 80 S.D. 104, 119 N.W.2d 914 (1963).
60 249 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1952).
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a matter of law, that reasonable men would not consider the
defendant's acts unwarranted. The Court said:
the rule defining the extent of the right is based on the pre-
mise that the standard by which the act is judged is that of a
reasonable man.... Since there is no hard and fast definition
of the right each must turn on its own facts .... Such a rule
necessitates a balancing of the interests of the two parties in
the litigation, as well as those of the public.8 '
The Court then said that since there was no Kentucky case
directly in point, foreign decisions would be considered. How-
ever, the Court eventually reached the conclusion that "under the
rule laid down in the Voneye case, the mailing of the post card did
not constitute an invasion of the appellant's right of privacy."
62
Viewing Voneye and Perry, Kentucky has developed what might
be loosely denominated as a negligent invasion of privacy tort.
Basically, torts are divided into two categories: intentional and
unintentional. The former requires an intentional or deliberate
act that violates a legally protected interest. The unintentional
tort is an act which, through the actor's negligence, also violates an
interest. There is negligence on the actor's behalf because he
failed to adhere to the standard required of a reasonable man
under the circumstances. To come under the doctrine of the in-
vasion of privacy tort, the act may be of the latter group; it need
not be intentional or deliberate. 63 This theory finds support in
Kentucky case law.6
Three relatively recent cases reaffirmed the rule that an action
for invasion of privacy will not lie where the offensive statements
were oral. In each of these cases, but for the oral nature of the
statements, there would have been an invasion of privacy within
the meaning and requirements of the intentional invasion theory.
In Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Company, 5 the defendant's manager,
61 Id. at 813.
621 d. at 814.
63 Credence is lent to this statement by the Court's language in the most
recent privacy case, Wheeler v. P. Sorenson Mfg. Co., 415 S.W.2d 582 (Ky.
1967), where the Court held: "The rule defining the extent of the right [of
privacy] is based on the premise that the standards by which the act is judged
are that (sic] of a reasonable man." Id. at 585.
64 See Tomlin v. Taylor, 290 Ky. 619, 162 S.W.2d 210 (1942); Trammel v.
Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941); Rhodes v. Graham,
238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W.
967 (1927); Foster-Milbum v. Cbinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909).
65 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d 510 (1943).
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while in the plaintiff's business establishment, made an oral
accusation that certain cigarettes in the plaintiff's possession were
stolen. In Horstman v. Newman,66 there was an oral demand by
a landlord that the plaintiff pay his rent. In Pangallo v. Murphy,
67
a landlord, in the presence of others, told the plaintiff, a lady
confined in a hospital bed due to pregnancy, that he had removed
her belongings from her house and locked them up, and that she
and her family were not fit persons to live in his house because
they were filthy and dirty.68 In each situation, there were the
intentional and deliberate acts that are necessary for intentional
torts.
In some cases, however, the intentional tort theory does not
apply. In Sellers v. Henry,69 publishing the picture of a mutilated
child was not an intentional violation since it was used in a
safety film, to teach children to be more careful when walking
upon the highway. There was no deliberate effort to invade any-
one's privacy. Although the case was remanded on other grounds,
the Court inferred that the plaintiff had a cause of action, even
though there was no attempt to injure or coerce him or any
wantonness or recklessness in publishing the photograph, unless
there was a public interest involved. This case is reminiscent of
Douglas v. Stokes.70 In Douglas the photographer certainly did not
intend to coerce or injure the plaintiffs in any manner. His reason
for making additional photographs of the Siamese twins was
obviously mercenary, but the injury resulted notwithstanding his
intent or deliberateness. The ratio decidendi in Douglas cannot
square with the intentional tort theory.
To the same effect is Jones v. Herald Post Company,71 where
there was merely the publication of a picture and statements
actually made by the plaintiff at the scene of the killing of her
husband. There were no deliberate or intentional efforts to coerce
or injure the plaintiff, or any wantonness or recklessness involved,
as required by the intentional tort theory. The Court of Appeals
seems to ask simply whether there was an invasion of the plain-
66 291 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1956).
67243 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1951).68 This case is an appropriate illustration of the closeness of the invasion of
privacy tort to defamation.69 Sellers v. Henry, 329 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1959).
70 Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912).
71 Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929).
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tiff's privacy: did the defendant intentionally and deliberately
do an act which, irrespective of his subjective intent, invaded the
plaintiff's privacy?72 If the answer to this question is in the
affirmative, the Court next seeks to find whether that act was un-
warranted. Questions of law and fact permeate both these ap-
proaches, but obviously the first is a question of law and the
second a question of fact. In any event, a violation of the invasion
of privacy tort does not necessarily have to be intentional.
Kentucky is still perhaps quite a few years behind the times
because it has no definitive rule to determine if an invasion occur-
red or if the action of invasion was unwarranted. Since the in-
vasion of privacy is a tort, the adequate criterion as in all tort
cases, consistent with the Voneye and Perry cases, would obviously
be the reasonably prudent man test. The rule could be phrased:
In order to constitute an invasion of the right of privacy,
an act must be of such a nature as a reasonable man can see
might and probably would cause mental distress and injury to
anyone possessed of ordinary feelings and intelligence situated
in like circumstances as the plaintiff.73
As stated, the rule should sufficiently clear away any problems
that might arise due to closeness of the invasion of privacy tort
and the tort of defamation. In Pangallo v. Murphy,"4 the words
uttered may well have been defamatory except that the complaint,
slanted in terms of an invasion of privacy tort, sought to recover
damages for physical harm and mental anguish suffered by the
plaintiff. The Court cited Brents as authority for the proposition
that the invasion of privacy cannot be an oral publication, but it
went on to say: "Under certain conditions, slanderous words are
actionable per se." 75 This is clearly defamation. "In other instances,
certain words are actionable per quod."76 In the latter case, such
words are not actionable alone, but, should extrinsic facts show
72 1n Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn.
1948), the court reasoned that the protection afforded by the right of privacy was
restricted to ordinary sensibilities and not supersensitiveness, and that there are
some shocks, inconveniences, and annoyances which members of society must
absorb without any right of redress. Thus, despite the allegation that the de-
fendant's act was willful and malicious, there exists no cause of action if the
plaintiff's privacy has not been invaded. Accord, Werner v. Times Mirror Co., 193
Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1961).
73Accord, 41 Am. Jun. Privacy § 12 (1941).
74243 S.W.2d. 496 (Ky. 1951).
75 Id. at 497.
76 Id.
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that damage resulted to the plaintiff, an action would lie. The
basis for the invasion tort is unwarranted conduct which invades
another person's privacy. Thus, if a statement such as that made
in Elkins v. Roberts,77 that the plaintiff "told a lie and I will have
him indicted for it," is published and results in special damages,
suit may be prosecuted under the defamation or invasion of
privacy theory.
A unique situation arose in Thomas v. General Electric
Company8 where the defendant employer took certain photo-
graphs of the plaintiff employee contrary to the latter's request.
The employer maintained that the pictures were taken in order
to increase the efficiency of the plant's operation and to promote
the safety of the employees in the discharge of their duties. The
employee filed suit in state court seeking damages of one dollar
and an injunction against the employer's showing, processing, or
publishing of the pictures, and prohibiting the future taking of
photographs without the employee's express permission. The cause
of action was based upon the Kentucky right of privacy tort.
The case was removed to federal court"9 where the complaint
was dismissed. The rationale was two-fold: 1) if the rule was that
the right of an employer to photograph is inferior to the em-
ployee's right when such photographs would affect the latter's
health, welfare, domestic situation, make him nervous, or sub-
ject him to an undue or unfair criticism by fellow employees, then
the plaintiff had failed in his burden of proof; but, 2) if this were
not the rule, there must be an unwarranted and improper use of
the photographs in connection with a defamatory or libelous state-
ment about the plaintiff. The first rationale was an inaccurate
application of the Kentucky invasion of privacy rule because the
court's primary function is to determine, (1) whether the plain-
tiff's privacy has been invaded, and (2) whether the invasion was
unwarranted. This would certainly have been a question of law for
the court to decide prior to ruling upon the evidence.80 On the
77 242 S.W.2d 994 (Ky. 1951).
78 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
7 Perhaps the most important aspect of this decision was the court's treat-
ment of the asserted amount in controversy vis-h-vis the injunction in determining
whether the federal court had jurisdiction.80 In one case, this determination was made, as a matter of law, prior to
ruling on the evidence. Wheeler v. P. Sorenson Mfg. Co., 415 S.W.2d 582 (Ky.
1967).
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second point, the court approached the theory of defamation by
ruling that had the photograph been taken and used in a de-
famatory manner or with defamatory or libelous words, the cause
of action would have been for defamation and not privacy.
Perhaps one surprising sideline to the general application of
the doctrine can be found in Wheeler v. P. Sorenson Manufactur-
ing Company.8' There, the plaintiff's employer disseminated in-
formation sheets to other employees in a unionizing campaign,
showing the plaintiff's paycheck with her hours worked, gross
wages, deductions and "take home" pay. She also alleged that the
sheet stated: "In 1 year, 4 months and 1 week [the plaintiff] re-
ceived an increase of 200 per hour or $8.00 per week."8 2 She
claimed she had taken no part in the union campaign, but because
of the sheet, her fellow employees believed she was working on be-
half of the company, making her work uncomfortable and un-
pleasant. She further alleged that she was later discharged, and
was blacklisted by other employers in the locality.
The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the case. After re-
viewing the usual invasion cases, the Court stated that the tort "is
determined by the norm of the ordinary man,"' ' and that the in-
vasion of privacy, if any, "was reasonable and warranted under the
circumstances."84 Determination of whether the invasion, if any,
was warranted is consistent with the general procedure followed
in Kentucky cases.
The unique aspect of the case is a small paragraph, im-
mediately preceding the Court's affirmation of the trial judge's
action,8 5 which indicates that the act of invasion is unwarranted,
except in a small number of cases, when humiliating collection
methods are used or publications, names, or pictures are used to
promote various enterprises. If the Court's language is indicative
of the future use of invasion of privacy, the practicing attorney
must seek some tactic, act, or conduct by the defendant that is
violent, humiliating, intentional, or designed to be any of these,
81415 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1967).
82 Id.
831d. at 585.
84 Id.
85 "Many of the invasions of the right of privacy for which recovery has been
sougt are the result of unwarranted and humiliating methods put in motion by
creditors to collect debts, or the unwarranted publications or use of the names or
pictures to promote various enterprises." Id.
[Vol. 56,
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before he can avail himself of the cause. Such a requirement
certainly cannot be intended by the Court since it would be con-
trary to the express language generally used to explain the
privacy rule.
Thus, the invasion of privacy tort cannot contain an oral state-
ment; but if the words are written, the invasion tort becomes a
less stringent libel rule which merges into the invasion of privacy
tort. This is the way the cases are practiced in Kentucky, and this
is the strategy which a trial attorney must consider prior to
filing suit. The Kentucky tort is and can only involve a negligent
invasion of privacy. The criterion of conduct is the reasonably
prudent man test, and the jury determines what the reasonably
prudent man really does and who he really is.
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